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A Return to First Principles: Rethinking ALJ
Compromises
Jeffrey A. Wertkin*
INTRODUCTION

In the last century, the United States has developed into a vast
and complex administrative state. The evolving apparatus that
manages this state exercises elements of traditionally judicial,
executive and legislative powers. Although much has been written
on the sprawling bureaucracy in our separated system, one area that
has not received significant attention is the position of Administrative
Law Judge ("AL"). ALJs are vested with no less responsibility for
maintaining the integrity of our federal laws than constitutionally
vested judges. They preside over cases involving radio and TV
broadcasting licenses; gas, electric, oil and nuclear energy allocation
and rates; labor-management relations compliance; consumer product
enforcement cases; corporate mergers; health and safety regulatory
proceedings; securities trading regulatory proceedings; social security
benefit adjustments; international trade cases; and a host of other
matters. 1 Despite their broad role in the American bureaucracy, the
statutory scheme governing executive branch decision makers has
created an uneasy existence for the ALJ.
Since their creation, hearing examiners and ALJs have been at the
heart of a conflict between contrasting approaches to executive

* J.D. 2002, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Professor Daniel
Ernst for his helpful comments on early drafts of this Note. Thanks also to Judge
Marian Horn for generously giving her time and for providing thoughtful criticism
and provocative counter-points to my argument.
1. THE ALJ HANDBOOK: AN INSIDERS GUIDE TO BECOMING AN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 3 (Linda P. Sutherland & Richard L. Hermann eds.,

3d ed. 1997).
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branch decision-making. 2 On one hand, executive branch decisionmaking could follow an "agency-centered" approach where
regulatory conflicts are resolved by policy-driven agency experts.
On the other hand, executive branch decision-making could follow a
"court-centered approach" where disinterested individuals with
separate powers and functions decide controverted agency issues. By
enacting the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 ("APA") 3 ,
Congress dealt directly with this conflict and made a distinct policy
choice in favor of a "court-centered" approach to administrative
decision-making. 4 For decades after its enactment, scholars and
federal judges implementing the APA valorized this policy choice,
placing a high premium on process values and judicializing the AL.
Corresponding to this policy shift toward a more judicialized or
"court-centered" approach to agency decision-making, the AU
position has undergone a shift away from its bureaucratic roots and
toward a more traditional legal framework.
This article challenges the soundness of Congress' initial policy
choice regarding the ALJ. By questioning the assumption that
formalizing procedure and insulating decision makers necessarily
leads to more fair and just outcomes, this paper attempts to show that
choosing between alternative paradigms of decision-making involves
a trade-off of process values and often represents a specific policy
preference. By examining the exact nature of the court-centered and
agency-centered compromises that created the ALJ and reviewing the
ways in which these compromises have faltered in recent decades,
this article suggests we look beyond the traditional court model for a
new conception of executive branch decision-making. This is not to
say that ALJs deserve any less responsibility, prestige or respect, but
2. The APA originally used the term "hearing examiner" when referring to the
special class of administrators who heard formal adjudications. Administrative
Personnel, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (Aug. 19, 1972); Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (1978). This term was first phased out by a Civil Service
Commission regulation in 1972, and the APA was finally amended to substitute
"administrative law judge" in 1978. Id. While I acknowledge that the symbolism
of the semantics are important, the name change was not accompanied by any
substantive changes and so I use these terms interchangeably unless otherwise
indicated.
3. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
4. These concepts will be defined thoroughly in Part I, infra.
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rather that the nature of regulatory agencies and problems suggests
that we should consider embracing a different paradigm for ALJ
decision-making.
Part I of this article will explore the ideological conflicts
underlying executive branch decision-making in the American
bureaucracy. This section will outline two opposing paradigms of
executive branch decision-making: the first approach embodies
"court-centered" principles, the second approach embodies "agencycentered" principles. The goal of this section is to identify the basic
principles underlying each approach.
Part II will examine the debate over ALJs that accompanied the
larger Congressional debate over the APA. Specifically, this section
will explore the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments made by
advocates of the court-centered and agency-centered approaches.
Ultimately, the agency-centered approach that was employed in the
first half of the century was abandoned for a court-centered approach.
This section will use contemporaneous writings to explore the
cleavage between these two groups and argue that the APA
represents a specific policy choice by Congress of the court-centered
approach over the agency-centered approach.
Part III will briefly review the various ways in which this original
policy choice concerning the role of executive branch decisionmakers has been reinforced by the Supreme Court and other actors
since 1946. This section will also draw upon recent commentaries on
agency decision-making to question the continuing viability of the
original policy choice favoring the court-centered approach.
Focusing on the different types of executive branch decisionmakers-ALJs, Administrative Judges ("AJs"), and other agency
officials-this section will highlight some of the shortcomings of the
APA framework.
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COURT-CENTERED AND AGENCY-CENTERED APPROACHES TO
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING

A. Introduction
The conflict between court-centered and agency-centered
approaches to executive branch decision-making began with the rise
of the administrative state, was further defined by the enactment of
the APA, and continues to rage among lawyers, scholars and judges.
Pieces of this debate have been explored in different contexts and
variously characterized as legalist versus scientific, 5 the rule of law
versus bureaucratic efficiency, 6 institutional decision-making versus
judicialized decision-making, 7 and adjudicative versus polycentric. 8
This section will draw together previous scholarship on this conflict
into two over-arching classifications: court-centered approaches and
agency-centered approaches to executive branch decision-making.
Three points are worth making before undertaking this task.
First, while much has been written about the legal process and
theories of adjudication in traditional courts, the focus here is on
decision-making in the administrative context. Thus, I look to
elucidate principles about executive branch decision-making from
sources that focus on public administration rather than adjudication
in traditional courts. Second, procedures and rules are rarely created
for their own sake, but rather embody specific principles and are
enforced in ways that maximize the underlying principle. Thus,
instead of discussing specific procedures or rules, this section will
focus on the principles underlying each approach and briefly mention
procedures or rules usually associated with such principles. Finally,
the following is not a complete list, but rather principles that appear
most often in the literature. For the sake of parsimony, the principles
5. MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 22 (1992).
6. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative
ProcedureAct Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U.L. REv. 1557 (1996).
7. See Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in
the FederalAdministrativeAgencies, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 759 (1981).
8. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv.

353 (1978) (originally written and circulated in 1957).
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given attention are those that create the greatest conflict between the
two disparate approaches to the ALJ and administrative decisionmaking.
B. Court-Centered Principlesto Administrative Decision-Making
Court-centered principles to administrative decision-making are
derived from principles of due process and formalism that exist in
common law and federal courts. This section attempts to elucidate
those traditional courtroom principles that advocates have expressly
attached to the administrative decision-making process.
Principle One: Participation
One of the defining characteristics of the American legal system
is the belief that individuals and organizations have a fundamental
right to participate in decisions that affect their well-being. This
participation principle is firmly established in traditional courts in the
form of the Due Process Clause, which ensures the rights of litigants
to call witnesses, submit evidence, and present reasoned arguments to
a judge. 9 Many have argued that this principle should extend to the
administrative context in the same manner. While the opportunity to
speak and be heard does not require the presence of a judicial figure,
judges are prominently featured as the participation principle that is
extended to agency decision-making.
In 1929, Lord Hewart, former Chief Justice of the Royal Court of
England, argued against the abridgement of process in cases arising
out of government action.' Hewart grounded his argument in the
principle that private property must be strictly protected from
government intervention. " Hewart saw a contradiction between the
preservation of property rights and social change and insisted that

9. Id. at 369 ("Adjudication is a process of decision that grants to the affected
party a form of participation that consists in the opportunity to present proofs and
reasoned arguments.").
10. See HEWART OF BURY, LORD, THE NEW DESPOTISM (1929)
11. HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 227.
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administrative law should be derived from private law.' 2 Others have
recognized the legitimacy of administrative proceedings, but argued
that parties to these proceedings should have the same opportunity to
participate as in a civil or criminal court because administrative
decisions often put private property at risk. In 1964, Charles Reich
drew on the principle of private property to articulate a further
justification for a court-centered approach to administrative decisionmaking.1 3 Reich argued that the administrative state created various
forms of government-created wealth in the form of subsidies,
contracts, licenses, benefits, and use of public resources.1 4 Since this
"new" property created as many rights as traditional forms of
property, Reich argued that government decisions affecting this new
property should be decided by judges or judge-like adjudicators after
full participation by the parties. 15 Thus, a central theme in the
writings of both Hewart and Reich is that administrative law should
be premised on a private law claim and evaluated by constitutionally
vested judges.
Alternative justifications for the participation principle often
emphasize the "intangible benefits" of participation in the
administrative process. For example, in his 1970 book Defending the
Environment, Joseph Sax discussed the virtues of making available a
judicial forum open to public participation. 16 According to Sax, the
level of participation allowed in administrative proceedings "is a
measure of the willingness of government to subject itself to
challenge on the merits of decisions made by public officials; to
accept the possibility that the ordinary citizen may have useful ideas
to contribute to the effectuation of the public interest."' 7 In this
articulation of the participation principle, executive branch decision
makers are not reified experts, but arbiters whose decisions benefit
from the input of litigating parties.

12. Id. at 227-28.
13. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).

14. Id. at 734-37.
15. Id. at 783-85.
16. JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1970).

17. Id. at 57.
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Similarly, Barry Boyer argued that private litigants may gain
some emotional satisfaction from participating in administrative
decision-making processes: "private litigants may gain satisfaction
from having the right to force agencies to come forward and formally
justify their positions, and there may even be psychological benefits
in the 'battle atmosphere' of adversary litigation."' 18 Boyer's
argument suggests that the presence of judges, rather than experts,
may imbue the system with legitimacy from the perspective of the
litigants.
Principle Two: Objectivity/Impartiality
The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution requires that an impartial and detached judge preside
over judicial proceedings. 19 In the legal process conception of
adjudication, the judge acts as an impartial arbiter ° who brings an
"uncommitted mind" to the hearing. 2 ' The objectivity/impartiality
principle is based on the notion that such requirements are necessary
22
to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system.
The logic follows that the judiciary could not function as a viable
institution in a democracy if the public lost faith in the impartiality or
objectivity of its judges.23 Traditional courts have dealt with the

18. Barry B. Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-type Hearings for
Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1 11,
148 (1972) (citing Sax, supra note 16). This article by Barry Boyer, an attorney
advisor to the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, originated as a
staff report to the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States.
Id. at 111.
19. Ward v. Viii. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972); see also In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.").
20. See Fuller, supra note 8, at 365.
21. Id at 386.
22. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
Since the judiciary possesses "neither the purse or the sword," the proper
functioning of the judiciary depends on the willingness of members of society to
follow its mandates. Id.
23. Ignoring the impartiality principle "invite[s] votes which are influenced
more strongly by general predilections in the area of law involved than they are by
lawyer-like examination of the precise issues presented for decision." Henry M.
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principle by trying to insulate judges from undue influences through
rules regarding judicial appointments, disqualifications for bias, and
in granting Article III federal judges life tenure.
The court-centered approach has sought to extend the
objectivity/impartiality principle to administrative proceedings.
Roscoe Pound argued that the relationship between an agency and an
executive branch decision maker causes undue influence and makes
it very difficult for the decision maker to remain unbiased in fact and
in appearance. 24 In an article advocating the independence of ALJs,
Karen Kauper has noted that the issue of impartiality is especially
acute in administrative proceedings because the simple association
between executive branch decision-makers and an agency will cause
decision makers to likely develop or adopt the agency viewpoint and
approach to problems. 25 Specifically, Kauper argued that the quality
of decision-making suffers from the long association of each ALJ
with one agency: "Adjudicators hearing the same type of cases for
any length of time may rely on their own preconceptions of a
problem to decide a case. '"26 Thus, both Pound and Kauper assert
that bias damages the administrative system, and they27 suggest a
severance of the relationship between ALJs and agencies.
Principle Three: Accuracy
Accuracy is a central dilemma for the judiciary because of the
28
difficulty in verifying whether or not a certain outcome is accurate.
Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 124
(1959).
24. ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 442-43 (1959).

25. Karen Y. Kauper, Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law
Judges: A Model Administrative Law Judge Corps Statute, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM. 537, 544 (1985).
26. Id. at 546.
27. Writing on separation of functions, Asimow states: "A true believer in
judicialized forms . . . might recommend that adjudication be conducted
exclusively by persons with no other agency responsibilities- ideally by a separate
administrative court." Asimow, supra note 7, at 759.
28. John Allison succinctly makes the point: "a decision maker can never
know with certainty that a decision is normatively accurate." John R. Allison,
Combinations of Decision-Making Functions, Ex Parte Communications, and
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To overcome the accuracy dilemma, courts rely on procedures to
achieve the maximum level of confidence in each outcome. Noting
that accuracy is impossible to measure, John Allison suggested a
model for approximating accuracy: "the greatest degree of
confidence is achieved by designing and consistently applying
29
procedures that seem most likely to produce accurate results."
Thus, the quest for accuracy in federal courts is coextensive with the
creation of procedural rules aimed at reassuring affected
constituencies. The Supreme Court has used this approach to the
accuracy principle to guide its determination on appropriate due
process,3 ° and renowned legal scholars such as Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks have also drawn an explicit connection between sound
procedures and wise decisions. 3 '
Some scholars argue that the same accuracy dilemma that exists
in the federal courts exists in administrative law contexts. For these
authors, extending the accuracy principle to the administrative
context means insisting that certain procedural safeguards be applied
to all executive branch decision-making bodies. For example,
Allison noted that even in administrative contexts, "carefully
conceived and applied procedure is the best proxy for substantive
decision accuracy. '"32 Similarly, Barry Boyer noted that the use of
trial-type hearings in an administrative context can make an
important contribution to the accuracy of decisions reached at later

Related Biasing Influencs: A Process-Value Analysis, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1135,

1149 (1993). Allison notes the same statement holds true for "positive" accuracy
(referring to the "fact-finding" aspects of decision-making) as it does for
"normative" accuracy (referring to the "developing or applying norm" aspects of
decision-making. Id. at 1148-89.
29. Id. at 1149.
30. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (deciding due process
cases based on the risk of "erroneous deprivation" of life, liberty or property). See
also Allison, supra note 28, at 1148-51.
31. A procedure that "'is soundly adapted to the type of power to be exercised
is conducive to well-informed and wise decisions. An unsound procedure invites
ill-informed and unwise ones."' William N. Eskridge and Phillip P. Frickey, The
Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARv. L. REV. 2031, 2044 (1994) (quoting
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 173 (tent. ed. 1958)).

32. Allison, supra note 28, at 1149.
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stages of the proceeding or in the larger arena of general legislative
policy formation.33 Implicit in all these arguments is the presumption
that relying on procedural requirements, rather than relying on the
inherent wisdom of the decision makers, is most likely to ensure
accurate results.
PrincipleFour: Reasoned Elaboration
The final principle of the court-centered approach to
administrative decision-making is derived from Hart and Sacks'
theory of "reasoned elaboration. ' '34 Since legislative statutes often
give general or vague directives, an official applying a "general
directive arrangement must elaborate the arrangement in a way which
is consistent with the other established applications of it and must do
so in a way which best serves the principles and policies it
expresses."35 According to Hart and Sacks, the notion of reasoned
elaboration is a critical part of the legal process because it ensures
interpret ambiguous language to reflect
that officials do not simply
36
their own political values.
Advocates of the court-centered approach have argued that
judicial review should play the same legitimizing role in
administrative law that the Legal Process School's notion of
"reasoned elaboration" once held out for traditional courts. In 1965,
Louis Jaffe argued strongly for the availability of judicial review of
administrative decisions. 37 Later, the articulation of the "hard-look
doctrine" by the Supreme Court imported the reasoned elaboration
33. Boyer, supra note 18, at 144. Boyer illustrates this point by reference to the
1957 licensing amendments to the Atomic Energy Act requiring hearings
regardless of whether any parties or interveners were opposing issuance of the
license. Despite the objection that a trial-type hearing in the absence of disputed
facts or issues is a doctrinal and logical absurdity, Boyer notes a strong belief that
these hearings could improve the quality of the ultimate decision. Id.
34. Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 31.
35. Id. at 2043.
36. Id.
37. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320

(1965). "The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition,
psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which
purports to be legitimate, or legally valid." Id.
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principle from the traditional courtroom setting.38 Under "hard look
review," even if an agency exercised discretion within statutory
bounds and considered all the right factors, federal courts can reverse
if the agency's decision was unreasonable-if the agency made a
"clear error of judgment. 39
Hard-look review compares the agency's stated
rationale for a decision with supporting or opposing
data and policy views gathered by the agency in the
Hard-look review thus
administrative record.
embodies the principle of reasoned elaboration by
encouraging the executive branch decision-maker to
articulate the connection between his or her decision,
and the policy behind the
the available evidence,
40
statute.
organic
C. Agency- CenteredApproach to Administrative Decision-Making
Principle One: Knowledge, Wisdom and Expertise
The bedrock principle of the agency-centered approach is that
administrators, rather than judges, should make decisions because
administrators have superior knowledge, wisdom and expertise in
any given area. The first scholars to advance this expertise theory
were part of what Morton Horwitz has called the "scientific
tradition."'n In contrast to traditional ideas of legality and the rule of
law, the development of a scientific or expertise justification of
administrative power achieved prominence in the Progressive era.4 2
38. Motor Vehicle Mrfs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
51-57 (1983).
39. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
40. Id.
41. HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 222. Among those scholars in the Progressive
tradition, Horwitz identifies Woodrow Wilson, James Landis, John Dickinson, and
Frank Goodnow as the most influential. Id. at 222-25.
42. Id. at 224. The Progressive era in American history spans roughly from
1900-1917, and it was characterized by political active pressure groups with
reformist agendas all competing for the reshaping of American society. See
generally, RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955).
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The Progressive movement was highly skeptical of the competence
of courts to perform the important tasks of social engineering that
were gaining momentum in the years leading up to the New Deal.4 3
While skeptical of the courts, Progressive thinkers had a strong
admiration for professional skill and put their faith in the wisdom of
experts in effectuating administrative law. 44
Following on the Progressives' high opinion of bureaucracy,
James Landis compared the development of the administrative state
in the twentieth century with the rise of the system of equity in the
seventeenth century.4 5 Landis argued that many people opposed the
rise of equity courts for the same reason that people feared the rise of
the administrative state: both seem threatening because they place
"alien hands upon the sacred ark of the covenant." 46 Landis
suggested that the fear of the administrative state is short-sighted and
based only on "our own inadequate and myopic vision., 4 7 By
looking beyond the parochial prejudices of legal formalism, Landis
argued, the rise in administrative law can be seen as a response to the
popular desires of the citizenry for more "knowledge ... wisdom and
.. . expertness" in the handling of claims. 48 In this way, Landis
concluded that the growth of the American administrative state in the
twentieth century fulfilled the same need that the British courts of
49
equity fulfilled in the seventeenth century.
In The Administrative Process, Landis put forth a comprehensive
articulation of what can be called the knowledge, wisdom, and
expertise principle. 50 Landis argued that specialized knowledge was

43. HoRwrrz, supra note 5, at 225.

44. Id.
45. James Landis, The Challenge to Traditional Law in the Rise of
Administrative Law, 13 Miss. L.J. 724, 731 (1940-41).

46. Id.
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
1938) (hereinafter Administrative Process).

PROCESS

(Yale University Press
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important due to the complexity of regulating certain industries. 5
Since administrators possessed this special expertise developed from
their experience in regulating and from their ability to draw on their
staff of technicians, Landis argued that agency judgments
commanded significant deference. Thus, the knowledge, wisdom,
and expertise principle holds that administrative decisions deserve
deference from the judiciary because administrators possess special
expertise not possessed by the public, courts, or the legislature.
Principle Two: Flexibility
A central tension in administrative decision-making exists
between the drive to empower the bureaucracy to meet its
congressional and public mandates and the drive to curtail agency
discretion through procedures that structure -adjudication. Advocates
of the agency-centered approach argue that certain types of formal
process requirements can undermine effective administration by
limiting the flexibility of agencies. Investigating the limits of
process-oriented adjudication, Lon Fuller emphasized the
unsuitability of the adjudicative model to address complex, openended issues, or what he defines as "polycentric" issues. In a
polycentric problem:
[O]ne can never fix the value for a variable (X) and
then reason to optimal values for other variables (Y
and Z), because the choice of values for Y and Z
might alter the value of X, which in turn might change
the optimal values for Y and Z- and so on.
Accordingly, the only way to solve a polycentric
problem is to consider the effects 52on all variables at
once and search for an equilibrium.

51. Id. at 22. "[T]he art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of the
details of its operation, ability to shift requirements as the condition of the industry
may dictate, the pursuit of energetic measures upon the appearance of an
emergency, and the power through enforcement to realize conclusions as to
policy." Id. at 23-24.
52. Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False
Dichotomy between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75
B.U.L. Rev. 1273, 1314 (1995).
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In other words, the nature of process-oriented adjudication makes it
ill-suited to handle certain types of problems.
Advocates of the agency-centered approach stress that this search
for an equilibrium position conflicts with court-centered process
restrictions on decision-makers. In stark contrast to the procedural
requirements articulated by Hart and Sacks,53 Kenneth Culp Davis
has argued that executive branch decision makers need the flexibility
to consult privately with their own experts, and it is appropriate for
supervising judges, and agency supervisors to oversee the work of
administrative law judges on an ex parte basis.54 Similarly, Michael
Asimow noted that strict rules about ex parte communications and
exclusive record rules inhibit candid and much-needed advice from
experts but also cause substantial delay.55 Thus, the flexibility
principle is a central feature of the agency-centered approach,
prompting advocates to resist attempts to restrict bureaucratic
discretion.
Principle Three: Efficiency
The efficiency principle holds that decision-making objectives
should be attained at the least possible cost to avoid waste of scarce
resources. As a general rule, trial procedures are expensive. Even
proponents of the court-centered approach acknowledge that
litigation "is relatively extravagant in the time it is willing to invest in
letting interested persons state, be tested on, and restate their
positions."5 6 However, this problem is even more acute when
confronting complex or polycentric issues in an administrative
context.
Boyer noted that both regulators and industry
representatives have complained about the various inefficiencies of
53. See supra, note 31.
54. See KENNETH CuLP DAVIS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 2d Ed.,
1.8, 27-28. Davis called the prohibition against ex parte prohibitions in the original
APA an "extreme provision". Id.
55. See Asimow, supra note 7, at 779. To be fair, Asimow also acknowledges
that strict separation has value and concludes that "the problem of separation of
functions will never disappear." Id. at 804.
56. SAX, supra note 16, at 221.

Fall 2002

A Return to First Principles

the adjudicative hearing.57 Former commissioners have complained
that "issues will be litigated in a trial-type proceeding with a whole
apparatus of devices which can be manipulated to produce years-long
delay, ' 58 and industry representatives have complained that "trial
procedures can be used by public interveners to increase enormously
the cost and complexity of the proceedings. 5 9 The efficiency
principle holds that a simplification of procedure would substantially
reduce the costs by reducing the amount of time and resources an
agency has to invest in the decision-making process. Clearly, a
tension exists between the efficiency principle and other principles
such as the participation and accuracy principles. Many of those
scholars advocating an agency-centered approach seem to elevate the
efficiency principle above other concerns.
PrincipleFour: Consistency
Before discussing the consistency principle, it is important to
explain how the agency-centered approach counters the courtcentered accuracy principle. Several scholars have been highly
critical of the argument that trial-type procedures help ensure
accurate results in an administrative setting. Roger Noll explained
that as regulation has developed, agencies have behaved more like
neutral, passive judges of conflicts in regulated industry. 60 Noll
suggested that the adoption of these procedural safeguards in the
name of accuracy actually serve to affect the flow of information to
the passive decision-maker. 61 In other words, these procedures give
the regulated industry the advantage of controlling the flow of
information, which in turn give an impression of the regulatory
62
environment that is overly favorable to regulated industry.
Similarly, Boyer noted the difficulty of importing the accuracy
principle to administrative decision-making. 63 The fact that trial-type

57. Boyer, supra note 18, at 146.
58. Id. at 146 n.130.
59. Id. at 146.
60. ROGER NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 80 (197 1).

61. Id.

62. Id.
63. Boyer, supra note 18, at 144.
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procedures casts the decision-maker into a passive "umpire" role
causes two interrelated problems in the administrative context: (1)
such procedures can contribute to the agencies' "relative indifference
to long-range future effects of their decisions;" 64 and (2) it "makes it
likely that the immediate, highly vocal claims of the regulated
industry will prevail over the diffuse, long-range and unrepresented
65
interests of affected segments of the public."
In rejecting the notion that due process requirements serve to
enhance .accuracy in the administrative context, the agency-centered
approach turns to the consistency principle. Writing in the context of
social security disability cases, both Jerry Mashaw and Richard
66
Pierce note that consistency is the best proxy for accuracy.
Consistent agency determinations are vital for the effectuation of
polycentric agency goals. An example of an agency-centered
approach is what Mashaw calls the "bureaucratic rationality" model
of administrative decision-making. 67 In this model, the overriding
principles are efficient and consistent implementation of centrallyformulated policies. 68 To ensure consistency, agency heads cannot
rely on appeals by rejected claimants, 69 but should employ an
aggressive quality assurance program whereby a sample of ALJ
decisions are reviewed and graded on a variety of measures. 70 Thus,

64. Id.

65. Id.
66. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
AdministrativeAdjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 44 (1976) ("[T]he nearest approximation to
an index of accuracy is consistent adjudication: if like cases are being treated alike
by state agencies, then claimants are at least receiving formal justice through the
existing procedures."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control versus
Impermissible Bias in Agency Decision-making: Lessons from Chevron and Mr.
Stretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 481, 510 (1990) ("[C]orsistency is a good measure, and
perhaps the only measure, of accuracy in this context...").
67. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 25-26 (1983).
68. Id.
69. This would exclude review of questionable awards to nondeserving
claimants.
70. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the
Adjudicationof Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 772 (1974).
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in the agency- centered approach, the ability to hold executive branch
decision-makers accountable for their decisions is vital.7 '
Accuracy and consistency principles have often clashed in federal
cases about administrative procedure,. with judges predictably
opposing encroachments on the court-centered principles.7 2 Richard
Pierce argues that federal judges oppose efforts to control the conduct
of ALJs because such efforts "strike far too close to federal judges'
own turf.",7 3 He continues, if "the [Social Security Administration]
can exercise control over the productivity and consistency of its
has the power to exercise analogous
ALJs, perhaps some institution
74
judges."
federal
over
control
D. Conclusion
This section has outlined four central principles of the courtcentered and agency-centered approaches to administrative decisionmaking. Conceptually, it may be helpful to think of court-centered
and agency-centered approaches as endpoints on an ideological
spectrum. Thus, the procedures and structures that make up a
decision-making system can be more or less court-centered
depending on which of the aforementioned principles are more or
less sophisticated. Accordingly, the principles underlying each
approach are not mutually exclusive, but offer several points of
overlap that can potentially cause conflict. The main ideological
divergences in the court-centered and agency-centered approaches
can be summed up as follows: (1) participation versus efficiency; (2)
knowledge, wisdom, and expertise versus impartiality/independence;
71. It is important not to confuse the flexibility principle with the consistency
principle. At first blush, it might seem that constraining ALJs to promote
consistency would impair their ability to act in a flexible way. However, the
flexibility principle comes into play at a different point in the administrative
process. For example, the Social Security Administration should have the
flexibility to structure decision-making in the way it sees fit, and then be able to
hold its AUs to a high level of consistency. If it turns out that procedures are not
furthering agency policies or goals, the SSA retains the flexibility to adjust such
procedures.
72. See infra notes 115.
73. Pierce, supra note 66, at 486.
74. Id.
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(3) accuracy versus consistency; and (4) reasoned elaboration versus
flexibility. In all four cases, procedures enacted to promote one
principle would likely have a diluting effect on the other principle.
This section has hopefully imparted a strong sense of the courtcentered and agency-centered approaches, enabling the reader to
distinguish procedures that promote specific principles and ultimately
a court-centered or agency-centered approach to administrative
decision-making. The next section will highlight these conflicts in
the context of the administrative reform movement leading to the
enactment of the APA.
PART II: THE APA AND THE CONFLICT OVER ALJs: COURT-CENTERED
VERSUS AGENCY-CENTERED APPROACHES

A. Introduction:Two Major Ideological Conflicts over the ALI
After its enactment, conventional wisdom held that the
Administrative Procedure Act became law as a result of ideological
consensus. In 1986, Gellhorn and Davis characterized the APA as an
"obvious triumph of truth over ignorance," while characterizing
opposition to the New Deal as "hysterical. 75 In fact, recent
scholarship has persuasively argued that the APA was the result of
extensive political and ideological wrangling. George Shepherd
offers a comprehensive account of the political struggle between the
New Deal advocates and the anti-New Dealers over the nature of
administrative government and the content of an administrative
procedure reform bill. He argues that the fight over the APA was a
"pitched political battle for the life of the New Deal.",76 Similarly,
James Brazier reviews the political history leading up to the
enactment of the APA, with a special emphasis on the differences78
between the Walter-Logan Bill 77 and the final APA bill as enacted.

75. Kenneth C. Davis & Walter Gellhorn, Presentat the Creation:Regulatory

Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 511, 514-15 (1986).
76. Shepherd, supra note 6, at 1560.
77. In 1939, Representative Francis Walter and Senator Mills Logan
introduced similar bills in both chambers, which together became known as the
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Building on previous scholarship, this section seeks to utilize the new
theoretical categories to examine the debate over Administrative Law
Judges.
In the period leading up to the enactment of the APA, two
principal ideological conflicts emerged over the proper scope and
configuration of the executive branch decision-maker. The first
disagreement was over who should make the decisions, agency
experts or judges. The agency-centered advocates favored scientists
and experts under the umbrella of a centralized agency, while the
court-centered approach favored judges or independent decisionmakers with a strict separation of judicial and enforcement powers.
A second disagreement was over the neutrality of the advocate.
Agency-centered advocates argued to maintain the existing decisionmaking model in which a high level of coordination occurred to
ensure that adjudicative outcomes match policy preferences, while
the court-centered approach favored an impartial and independent
adjudicator immune from agency oversight and uninfluenced by the
political character of the agency. This section will consider these
disagreements in turn.
B. Who Decides-Judgesor Agency Experts?
Court-Centered Approach
Drawing on the participation and accuracy principles, advocates
of the court-centered approach argued that administrative decisions
should be made by constitutionally vested judges, or in the
alternative, by decision-makers with the same status and protection as
constitutionally vested judges. The early court-centered position,
advocated by members of what Horwitz has called the "Legalist"
tradition, argued that only a constitutionally vested judge should

Walter-Logan Bill. See H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., (3d Sess. 1939); S. 915, 76th
Cong., (1939).
78. James E. Brazier, An Anti-New Dealer Legacy: The Administrative
ProcedureAct, 8 J. OF POL. HIST. 206 (1996).
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make administrative decisions.7 9 The English scholar A.V. Dicey
posited an irreconcilable conflict between the traditional ideal of the
rule of law and the emergence of a modern system of administrative
regulation. 80 Dicey used the participation principle to justify his
court-centered approach, linking the growth of administration with
the decline of individualism. 81 Dicey argued against the existence of
against any notion of separate
regulatory agencies, and ultimately
82
executive branch decision-makers.
As the scope of government intervention grew, some advocates of
the court-centered approach grudgingly accepted that constitutional
courts alone could not control administrative activity, and instead
argued for the strict separation of decision-making functions from the
rest of the agency. Court-centered proposals sought to remove
decisional control from experts and social scientists in favor of
legally trained officials well versed in accuracy enhancing
procedures. Established in 1933, the American Bar Association's
Special Committee on Administrative Law ("ABA Committee") took
this position and presented several bills to create a separate
administrative court. 83 In 1936, the ABA Committee offered a bill
for a new administrative court that was introduced in the House by
Emanuel Celler and in the Senate by Mills Logan. 84 The LoganCeller Bill ("Bill") consolidated existing specialty courts and brought

79. See HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 225. Horwitz identified A.V. Dicey,
Roscoe Pound, and Friedrich von Hayek as scholars firmly rooted in the "legalist
tradition." Id. at 225-30.
80. ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982) (1915).
81. See HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 226.
82. See DICEY, supra note 80, at 213-67. Dicey proudly pointed out that "droit
administraif' was an expression that did not have an equivalent in the English
language and commented, "the want of a name arises at bottom from our nonrecognition of the thing itself." Id. at 215. See also HORWITZ, supra note 5, at

225-26.
83. In 1935, then chairman of the Committee, Louis Caldwell, stated: "A man
should not be judge in his own case and the combination of prosecutor and judge in
these tribunals must be relentlessly exposed and combated." Proceedings of the
Fifty-EighthAnnual Meeting of the A.B.A. (Third Session), 1935 A.B.A. ANN. REP.

141-42 (1935).
84. See S. 3787, 74th Cong. (1936); H.R. 12,297, 74th Cong. (1936).
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agency jurisdiction of licenses under the purview of an administrative
court staffed by lawyers or judges with extensive legal
backgrounds. 85 The proposal reaffirmed the ABA Committee's
commitment to removing experts and social scientists from the
decision-making process: "It is precisely this forbidden commingling
of the essentially different powers of government in the same hands
86
that is today the identifying badge of an administrative agency."
In 1938, Roscoe Pound became chairman of the American Bar
Association's Committee on Administrative Law and began his
assault on the combination of agency functions, or what he called
administrative absolutism. 87 Pound's approach was to decentralize
agency structure. 88 In July of 1938, the ABA released a report
comparing the runaway administrative state with the Soviet Union
dictatorship:
The ideal of administrative absolutism is a highly
centralized administration set up under complete
control of the executive for the time being, relieved of
judicial review and making its own rules. This sort of
regime is urged today by those who deny that there is
89
such a thing as law.
Perhaps the boldest variation on the separation of powers theme
was a legislative proposal in which hearings would be presided over
by "a lawyer learned in the law" appointed by the "United States
district judge for the district in which the person involved in the
controversy resides." 90 The Bill included a provision that the lawyer-

85. The Bill combined the Court of Claims, The Board of Tax Appeals, the
Customs Court, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See Shepherd,
supra note 6, at 1578.
86. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 1936 A.B.A. Ann.

Rep. 721 (1936).
87. Roscoe Pound, Administrative Law: Its Growth, Procedure and
Significance, 7 U. PITT. L. REv. 269 (1941).
88. Id.
89. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 1938 A.B.A. Ann.
Rep. 343 (1938).
90. S. 918 § 708(a), 77th Cong. (1941).
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judge should be "an experienced lawyer of not less than ten year's
practice at the bar," 9 1 reinforcing the court-centered notion that only
those with extensive legal training should preside over administrative
controversies.
Other important groups weighed in on the separation of functions
question. In 1937, the President's Committee on Administrative
Management recommended that independent commissions be
92
completely separated into administrative and judicial sections.
Further, a minority of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure suggested splitting agency functions in a
number of circumstances, such as cases where a private party faces
off against the government. 93 In a letter to Attorney General Robert
Jackson, included as an addendum to the Committee's final report,
Justice Lawrence Groner argued that all controversial adjudications
should be referred to commissioners who are wholly independent of
the agency.94 Groner suggested that only a wholly independent
board, with a composition similar to the Board of Tax Appeals, could
create a truly judicial atmosphere and therein a workable state of
Finally, responding to the Attorney
administrative review. 95
General's committee report, John Foster Dulles defended the position
that courts did indeed possess the wisdom, knowledge or expertise to
regulate satisfactorily. Arguing that certain types of administrative
cases should be heard by judges, Dulles wrote:
A society which relies primarily upon juries to find
the facts determinative of life or death, which finds
courts acceptable to decide the intricacies of patent
cases, can scarcely object to the use of the court to

91. Id.
92. PRESIDENT'S

COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT
WITH SPECIAL STUDIES 40 (1937). For a critique of the report, see Louis L. Jaffe,
Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, 52. HARv. L. REv. 1201, 1236-

42 (1939).
93. United States Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
Final Report, S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 203-09 (1st Sess. 1941) [hereinafter Attorney
General'sCommittee Report].
94. Id.
95. Id. at 248-250.
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determine the presence or absence of facts of the kind
which.

. .

would come before them.96

Agency-Centered Approach
Advocates of the agency-centered approach argued that expert
administrators, informed by a full staff and coordinated under a
centralized agency structure, were more qualified than judges to
make administrative decisions. This approach was the status quo in
the newly minted regulatory agencies of the 1920s and 1930s. In
most controverted cases there was little separation of judicial,
investigative, and enforcing functions, and in some cases, an
administrator with little or no legal training performed all three
functions. 97 For example, Lloyd Musolf cited a 1923 report from the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") revealing that hearing examiners
often received their assignments from the same official who directed
the investigations. 98 Other reports from the period indicate that in a
number of formal proceedings before FTC commissioners, agency
counsel, rather than the examiner, wrote the factual report that was
eventually submitted to the Commission.9 9 Musolf further noted that

in the Office of Indian Affairs or the Social Security Board, it was
not uncommon for the same person to examine witnesses and decide
the case.' 00
As the agency-centered position came under fire in the late
1930s, James Landis articulated perhaps the most persuasive defense
of entrusting expert administrators with decision-making power.'0 '
96. John Foster Dulles, The Effect In Practice of the Report on Administrative
Procedure,41 COLUM. L. REv. 617, 623 (1941).
97. See LLOYD MUSOLF,

FEDERAL EXAMINERS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAW

AND ADMINISTRATION 83 (1953) (describing in detail the experience of Charles W.
Whittemore, a trial examiner for the National Labor Relations Board with no
formal legal training, who presided over an unfair practices case in South
Carolina). Id. at 13-22 (from a personal interview with Whittemore on January 30,

1948).
98. Id. at 83.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See LANDIS, supra note 45, at 724-31; Administrative Process, supra note
50, at 15-45.
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Landis argued that the expertise needed for competent regulation
cannot come from judges or independent decision-makers. Such
expertise "springs only from that continuity of interest, that ability
and desire to devote fifty-two weeks a year, year after year, to a
particular problem."1 02 Similarly, Walter Gellhorn argued against the
notion "that the capacity to govern justly lies only beneath the black
robes of the judges, and that to them, the wise and good fathers, we
must turn hopefully for true guidance through the mazes of the
law."' 0 3 Gellhorn rejected the court-centered fear of entrusting
responsibilities to the administrative agencies, arguing that such a
fear not only produces poor government, but ultimately may produce
chaos and destroy faith in government itself. 104 Thus, the agencycentered approach was highly critical of the claim that only judges
should make decisions, and opposed attempts to decentralize agency
decision-making.
Some agency-centered advocates agreed that investigative and
decision-making responsibilities should be separated, but stopped
well short of removing agency experts from the process. In defense
of this position, the Attorney General's Committee Report noted that
decision-makers often have to make sense of vague statutory
Because this responsibility often involves a
language. 0 5
considerable amount of discretion, the Committee suggested that to
"divorce entirely the investigating and enforcing arm from the
deciding arm, may well impart additional confusion to this
process."'10 6 Recognizing that the process of regulating requires
consistency in approach, the majority of the Attorney General's
Committee argued07 against the complete separation of decisionmaking functions. 1

102. Administrative Process, supra note 50, at 23.
103. See SHEPHERD, supra note 6, at 1598 (quoting Walter Gellhorn, The
Improvement of Public Administration, 2 NAT. L. GUILD Q. 20, 23 (1940)).
104. Id.

105. "[T]he statutory prohibitions which administrative agencies are
commonly called upon to enforce are not and cannot be as clear. .. as a... bill of
sale." Attorney General's Committee Report, supra note 93, at 59.

106. Id.
107. Id.
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The APA Compromise
With the creation of a special class of administrators called
"hearing examiners," the APA marked a decisive victory for the
court-centered approach.
The APA approach was to divide
administrative decisions into "rules" and "orders."
Rules are
"designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy,"' 0 8
while orders are "the whole or part of a final disposition ...

of an

'0 9
agency in a matter other than rulemaking but including licensing."'
In this conception, agency experts make rules while a new set of
hearing examiners issue orders. APA hearing examiners were clearly
intended to be outside the circle of expert administrators comprising
the agency as their compensation, promotion and tenure; they were
placed in the control of the Civil Service Commission. 10 The courtcentered approach also won an important victory by considerably
decreasing the amount of interaction between agency experts and an
ALJ. First, the APA affirmatively separates investigative and
adjudicative responsibilities. Section 554 states that an "employee or
agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually
related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended
decision, or agency review.... "" Second, the APA prohibits ALJs
from consulting ex parte with any person on any fact in issue unless
all parties are notified and given an opportunity to participate in those
discussions. 112

The APA did contain some important concessions to the agencycentered approach, the foremost concession relating to agency
structure. The APA rejected the external separation of adjudicative
functions outside the agency and instead adopted an internal
separation.113 Under this internal separation scheme, the ALJ plays
only an intermediate role in the decision-making process while the
108. 5 U.S.C.A. § 551(4) (West Supp. 2002).
109. 5 U.S.C.A. § 551(6) (West Supp. 2002).
110. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 5372, 7521 (West Supp. 2002). See also Ramspeck v.
Fed. Trial Exam'r Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132 (1953).
111. 5 U.S.C.A. § 554(d) (West Supp. 2002).
112. 5 U.S.C.A. § 554 (West Supp. 2002).
113. Id.
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agency is the final decision-maker. 1 4 The APA further grants to the
agency broad discretion to overrule the ALJ: "On appeal from or
review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it
would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the
issues on notice or by rule.""' 5 Recognizing the need for flexibility,
Congress did not extend the prohibition against the participation of
agency members in both prosecuting and judging to cases involving
licenses, rate-making, or for any case in which an agency member
presides. 116 Other sections of the APA contain exceptions to the
constraints of formal adjudication by an AL. Section 554 exempts
certain types of decisions from the constraints of a formal
adjudication by an ALJ,117 supporting the flexibility principle by
giving agency heads some discretion in choosing who will decide a
certain type of case.
The APA's conception of the AL's role thus involves a curious
mixture of autonomy and subservience. ALJs act independently in
all significant respects during the course of the decision-making
process, but once their decisions are made, they are not granted the
respect of finality. While APA provisions dividing rules and orders
emphasize court-centered principles of participation and accuracy in
agency adjudication, provisions granting agency review emphasize
This
agency-centered principles of expertise and consistency.

114. Id.
115. 5 U.S.C.A. §577(b) (West Supp. 2002); See Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492 (1951) (rejecting the argument that agency officials can
only reject an examiner's findings if they are clearly erroneous: "Such a limitation
would make so drastic a departure from prior administrative practice that
explicitness would be required."); FCC v. Allentown Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358,
364-65 (1955) (rejecting the Court of Appeals' conclusion that a Board can only
overrule an Examiner's findings where there is a "very substantial preponderance
in the testimony as recorded." Citing the Administrative Procedure Act, the
majority found that "this attitude goes too far."). It is important not to confuse
ALJs (or hearing examiners) with members of quasi-independent agency appeal
boards that review ALJ enforcement opinions.
116. 5 U.S.C.A. § 554(d)(2)(A)-(C) (West Supp. 2002).
117. 5 U.S.C.A. § 554(a)(2)-(4) (West Supp. 2002). These include the
selection or tenure of an employee, determinations resting solely on inspections,
tests or elections, and conduct relating to military and foreign affairs. Id.
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compromise, and the one discussed in the next section, has helped
create an uneasy existence for the ALJ.
C. Decision-MakerNeutrality
Court-Centered Approach
Advocates of the court-centered approach favored an impartial
and independent adjudicator immune from agency oversight and
uninfluenced by the political character of the agency. Under the
court-centered approach, parties to an administrative proceeding are
not only entitled to a hearing before a judge without a pecuniary
interest, but also a judge who is impartial and objective. Under this
conception, a decision-maker who presides over a hearing with a
"committed mind" has prejudiced the litigants and thus violated due
process. This point is best illustrated in three judicial opinions
involving allegations of bias in NLRB decisions. In Inland Steel Co.
v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.,1 18 the circuit court took the position that
bias is prejudice per se." 9 In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Nat'l
Labor Relations Bd.,'120 although prejudice was shown, the court
intimated there was no necessity to do so, as the partiality of the
examiner was sufficient to support a reversal.12 In Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.,' 22 Justice Stephens summed up the
court-centered argument in his dissent: "The bias itself is prejudice,
because the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
hearing and there can be no fair
Constitution guarantees a fair 23
hearing before a biased officer."1
Court-centered advocates doubted the capacity of executive
branch decision-makers to render impartial and objective decisions.
118. Inland Steel Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 109 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1940).
119. Id. at 20.
120. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 904 F.2d 1156
(7th Cir. 1990).
121. Id. at 1166.
122. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 120 F.2d 641 (D.C.
Cir. 1941).
123. 120 F.2d at 659.
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One of those most critical was ABA president Joseph Henderson who
quipped, "those who sit in administrative determination... are likely
to be conscientiously unconscious of what the lawyer soon learns;
namely, that there are two sides to most cases." 124 Since it is difficult
to show bias, court-centered proposals were aimed to help ensure
impartiality and objectivity. The Attorney General's Committee
Report recommended that hearing examiners be given the power to
administer oaths, examine witnesses and take testimony.' 25 The
Committee believed that granting these powers directly to the hearing
examiner, rather than vesting them in the agency, would avoid the
perception of the examiner as a mere figurehead for a partial agency:
"Parties have a sound desire to make their arguments and present
their evidence, not to a monitor, but to the officer who must in the
first instance decide or recommend the decision."1' 26 Backers of the
court-centered approach also believed that reasoned elaboration
would further secure decision-maker neutrality.
The Attorney
General's Committee aimed at formalizing examiners' decisions by
requiring them to be in writing, explain the reasoning behind the
findings and conclusions, be served on the parties for comment, and
be part of the record.1 27 The Attorney General's Committee Report
listed separate justifications for each one of these requirements: (1)
"The requirement of an opinion provides considerable assurance that
the case will be thought through by the deciding authority"; (2) "the
exposure of reasoning to public scrutiny and criticism is healthy"; (3)
"the parties to a proceeding will be better satisfied if they are enabled
to know the bases of the decision affecting them"; and (4) "opinions
enable the private interests concerned, and the bar that advises them,
to obtain additional guidance for their future conduct."'1 28 Although
some agencies were already abiding by these types of requirements,
placing the requirements in the statute "did tend to exalt the examiner
by regularizing an elaborate form for his decision and by lessening
' 29
the flexibility of agency control over it.'
124. Joseph W. Henderson, Lawyers Urge Judicial Curbs on Administrative
Abuses, 29 A.B.A. Journal 681, 683 (1943).
125. Attorney General's Committee Report, supra note 93, at 46.

126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
MUSOLF, supra note 97, at 109-10.
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Agency-centered Approach
In contrast, the agency-centered approach de-emphasized the
value of decision-maker neutrality in favor of more effective
administration of controversial laws. In articulating the agencycentered approach, A.H. Feller rejected the premise that federal
courts are particularly neutral. 130 Feller argued that one of the
"profound" reasons for the creation of administrative agencies was to
get the enforcement of laws with social and economic impact out of
the conservatively biased courts. 1 ' Feller emphasized that effective
enforcement of controversial policy requires a coordinated approach:
"Not only must there be coordination of information, there must also
be a coordination of regulatory policy, litigation policy, and
adjudicationpolicy."' 32 The notion that there can be such a think as
"adjudication policy" is a uniquely agency-centered approach to the
problem of decision-making in the administrative context.
Echoes of Feller's "adjudication policy" idea can be found in
other contemporaneous agency-centered writings. James Landis
asserted: "Partisanship or zeal on the part of administrative tribunals
in behalf of the rights they are created to protect is as much expected
of them as zeal on the part of judges in the defense of that body of
rights we are pleased to call our liberties." 133 Even President
Roosevelt's veto of the Walter-Logan bill included a strong
implication that administrative tribunals may favor certain policy
outcomes "wherever a series of controversies exist between a
powerful and concentrated interest on one side and a diversified mass
of individuals, each of whose separate interests may be small, on the
other side, the only means of obtaining equality before the law has
been to place the controversy in an administrative tribunal."1 34 Thus,

130. A.H. Feller, Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age, 41 COLUM.

L. REv. 589, 599 (1941).
131. Id. "When the administrative process is under fire, we hear much of the
bias of the administrators, forgetting that the creation of the more controversial of
these agencies was brought about by an explicit fear of the judiciary." Id.
132. Id. at 600 [emphasis added].
133. James M. Landis, Symposium on Administrative Law, 9 AM. L. SCH. REv.
18 (1938-1942).
134. CongressionalRecord, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (18 December 1940).
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the agency-centered approach did not see a contradiction between
elements of fairness and a conscious effort to interpret and apply
agencies' rules in a manner sympathetic to the purposes of Congress.
In order to carry out an adjudication policy, agency heads must
have a means to manage ALJs. Based on this view, Feller suggested
two important ways to configure the ALJ so as to secure the
advantages of institutional cooperation. First, he suggested that ALJs
should be appointed by the agency, and such an appointment should
be revocable based on "a reasoned statement by the agency that the
hearing commissioner has, over the period of a time, consistently
' 35
refused to follow the policies laid down by the agency head."'
Second, he suggested that the agency head should be able to give
hearing examiners directions on the conduct of ongoing hearings and
1 36
on rulings on admissibility of evidence and points of law.
Effectuation of these proposals would give agency officials the tools
to maintain a high level of coordination to ensure that ALJ decisions
137
matched agency policy preferences.
The APA Compromise
In addressing the issue of decision-maker neutrality, the APA
strongly affirmed court-centered principles by limiting the ability of
agencies to coordinate administrative decisions. Several provisions
of the APA sought to remove all management control over ALJs.
First, the APA adopted the civil service system of indefinite tenure so
138
that ALJs were not required to face reappointment proceedings.
Second, the bill prohibited agency control over compensation. 139 The

135. Feller, supra note 130, at 603.
136. Id.
137. The Attorney General's Committee recommended that an Office of
Administrative Procedure be created to appoint examiners, exercise general
supervisory powers, and remove examiners after a for-cause hearing. Attorney
General's Committee Report, supra note 93, at 46. The Committee also
recommended a seven-year fixed term. Id. Although these recommendations are
not particularly agency-centered, they are more in line with agency-centered
principles than the statutory scheme of the APA.
138. 60 Stat. 244 (1946); 5 U.S.C.A. § 3105
139. Id.
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APA mandated that the Civil Service Commission set the salary
rating for ALJs independently of agencies' ratings or
recommendations.' 40 Third, agencies may not choose which judge
14 1
hears a case, but rather agencies must assign cases in rotation.
Fourth, and most significant, the Act specifically exempts ALJs from
the provisions for performance evaluation and performance-based
142
removal actions that apply to all other federal agency employees.
The statutory scheme did include .one concession to the agencyapproach. Section 11 of the APA stated: "there shall be appointed by
and for each agency as many qualified and competent examiners as
14 3
may be necessary for proceedings pursuant to sections 7 and 8."
The scheme was interpreted by the Civil Service Commission to give
agencies the ability to decide which examiners are qualified and
competent.
The APA compromise over the evaluation of ALJs was neatly
summed up by Congressman Francis Walter:
Section 11 recognizes that agencies have a proper part
to play in the selection of examiners in order to secure
personnel of the requisite qualifications. However,
once selected, under this bill the examiners are made
independent in tenure and compensation by utilizing
and strengthening the44existing machinery of the Civil
Service commission. 1
D. Conclusion
We have seen that in two key areas relevant to ALJs, proponents
of the court-centered approach won significant victories over
Contrary to
proponents of the agency-centered approach.
approach by
court-centered
the
of
adoption
conventional wisdom,
140. 60 Stat. 244 (1946). The Office of Personnel Management currently has
this role. 5 U.S.C.A. § 5372.
141.
142.
143.
144.

60 Stat. 244 (1946); 5 U.S.C.A. § 3105.
60 Stat. 244 (1946); 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 4301(2)(D), 4302, 4303.
60 Stat. 244 (1946) [emphasis added].
92 Cong. Rec. 5655 (1946).
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Congress was not obvious or without serious and persuasive
opposing arguments. The next section will briefly examine recent
developments of the ALJ and reevaluate agency-centered arguments
in light of these developments.

PART

III: RETHINKING THE INITIAL COMPROMISE

Having outlined how two disputes between advocates of the
court-centered and agency-centered approaches were reconciled in
passage of the APA, this section will reevaluate these initial policy
choices with the benefit of over fifty years of hindsight. This section
will briefly review the implications of these initial policy choices in
order to reveal how they have led to an uneasy existence for the ALJ.
A. Who Decides-Judgesor Experts?
Changes Since 1946
Since the enactment of the APA, court-centered principles have
been fortified on several fronts. First, the Supreme Court has
reviewed the ALJ model and consistently reinforced principles of
participation, impartiality/objectivity, accuracy and reasoned
elaboration. In Wong Song v. McGrath,'4 5 one of the first cases
dealing with the ALJ,the Court held that the Due Process Clause and
organic statutes could require the presence of APA hearing
examiners. 146 Although this case was reversed by legislative action
that rejected the use of ALJs as presiding officers in immigration and
deportation cases, 47 it indicates the Supreme Court's strong
preference for a court-centered approach to administrative decisionmakers. The Supreme Court has also reinforced the notion that ALJs
should look and act more like judges than experts. In Butz v.
Economou, the Court indicated: "There can be little doubt that the
role of the ...

administrative law judge is 'functionally comparable'

to that of a [constitutional] judge.
145. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
146. Id.at 34.
147. Ardestani v. I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129

His powers are often, if not
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generally, comparable to those of a trial judge ... ,48

Two years

after Butz, the Supreme Court further observed that the independent
of a
ALJ is one whose "impartiality serves as the ultimate guarantee
49
fair and meaningful proceeding in our constitutional regime." 1
Second, staffing requirements as enforced by the Office of
Personnel Management ("OPM") has restricted the Office to formally
trained lawyers with extensive experience in traditional
courtrooms.150 To be selected as an ALJ, one must compete
nationally in a merit-based selection process administered by the
OPM.15 1 Candidates must demonstrate at least seven years of
significant litigation experience and submit multiple references that
inquire into judicial demeanor, capability and integrity. 52 A
personal interview is followed by a six-hour essay examination, in
must demonstrate his or her
which the prospective candidate
53
analytical and writing skills.'
The Uneasy Existence of the ALI
Although the Supreme Court has generally supported the APA's
initial compromise that decision-makers should resemble judges
rather than experts, agencies have reacted by severely limiting the
occasions in which an ALJ participates in the administrative process.
Agencies generally use two methods to avoid using an ALJ: (1)
favoring rulemaking over adjudication wherever possible, and (2)
using non-ALJ hearing officials.
Using the first method, agency officials go to great lengths to act
by issuing rules rather than issuing orders. Justice Scalia has
described this development of administrative law as a "constant and
accelerating flight away from individualized, adjudicatory

148. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
149. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 250 (1980).
150. THE ALJ HANDBOOK: AN INSIDERS
ADMINISTRATIvE LAW JUDGE 8-11 (1997).

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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proceedings to generalized disposition through rulemaking." ' 15 4 This
development has particularly negative implications for regulatory
schemes that were designed1 55by Congress to rely to a considerable
extent on trial-type hearings.'
The second method used by agencies involves the use of
administrative judges ("AJs"). AJs are accorded varying levels of
independence depending on the agency and the type of adjudications.
Generally, however, AJs lack the statutory protections granted to
ALJs. For example, AJs are not statutorily exempt from performance
appraisals, and regularly undergo such appraisals by the agencies for
which they work. 156 Jeffrey Lubbers uses empirical data to chart the
1 57
"drift away from ALJs" that has occurred at the federal level.
Relying on Office of Personnel Management data, Lubbers charts the
decline of the government-wide use of ALJs, finding that the number
of ALJs in the Federal Government has leveled off in the past
decade, and has actually decreased outside of the Social Security
Administration. 158 This decrease is not because agencies have
stopped adjudicating, but because they have limited their reliance on
59
ALJs. 1
Lubbers identifies three reasons why many government agencies
are running away from the ALJ program: cost, restrictions on
selection, and their effective immunity from performance
management. 160 These reasons correspond to the efficiency and
consistency principles of the agency-centered approach: "Agency
154. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the
Supreme Court, 1978 SuP. CT. REv. 345, 376 (1978).
155. William F. Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85
YALE L.J. 38, 38-39 (1975).
156. PAUL VERKUIL, DANIEL GIFFORD, CHARLES KOCH, RICHARD PIERCE &
JEFFREY LUBBERS, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY,

179-80 (1992)

[hereinafter Judiciary].
157. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity
Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 70 (1996). Lubbers notes that non-ALJ
adjudicators are "sprouting faster than tulips in Holland." Id. at 70 [hereinafter
Quest].
158. Id.

159. Id. at 71.
160. Id.
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managers obviously have great incentive to opt for using hearing
officers who can be selected strategically, who are easier to manage,
and who can be procured at bargain rates."' 6 ' Lubbers also indicates
that similar types of determinations made in different agencies are
being made by different types of decision-makers.1 62 Lubbers notes
that there are about 80 AJs who serve on Boards of Contract Appeals
in about a dozen agencies, that the Department of Veterans Affairs
has a fifty-five member staff reviewing benefits decisions (but no
ALJs), and that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
uses 95 to 100 AJs (but no ALJs). 16 3 Thus, while disability benefits
adjudications at the SSA are handled by ALJs, non-ALJ decisionmakers preside over disability benefits adjudications at the
Department of Veterans Affairs.' 64 Moreover, Lubbers notes that in
some contexts, "non-ALJ adjudicators preside over cases in which
extremely important issues of personal liberty are potentially at stake,
' 65
such as deportation proceedings and security clearance cases."'
Thus, despite the commitment to court-centered principles in the
original APA, agencies have found various ways to subvert the
statutory scheme. Efforts to promote agency-centered principles in
spite of the APA has contributed to the uneasy existence of ALJs and
raised several questions about the initial compromise. Does the
original statutory compromise still hold relevance for the
administration of the modern regulatory state? Are there alternative
schemes that would better reflect the exigencies of agency decisionmaking?

161. Id. at 73-74.
162. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an
Appropriate System of Performance Evaluation For ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.

589, 605 (1994).
163. Quest, supra note 157, at 71-72.
164. Judiciary,supranote 156, at 615.
165. Id.
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B. Decision-MakerNeutrality
Developments Since 1946
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the APA in a way
that emphasizes the court-centered approach to judicial neutrality. In
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 166 the majority
noted that under the APA, ALJs were no longer "mere tools of the
agency concerned and subservient to the agency heads in making
their proposed findings of fact and recommendations."' 167 Similarly,
in Butz v. Economou, 168 the Court granted ALJs absolute immunity
from tort suits based on their judicial act, reasoning that an ALJ
performs a role "'functionally comparable' to a judge."'1 69 These two
Supreme Court opinions have significantly affected the way lower
courts, practitioners, and scholars think about ALJs.
Congress in 1979 and 1980 considered several legislative
proposals that would provide for the evaluation of ALJ
performance. 7 ° These proposals did not attempt to amend the APA,
but placed the responsibility for performing evaluations outside the
employing agency.171 In rejecting the proposals, a joint report of the
Senate Government Affairs and Judicial Committees referred to the
impartiality/objectivity principle: "The existence of an evaluation
system would make it impossible for ALJs to retain their objectivity

166. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
167. Id. at 131.
168. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
169. Id. at 513-14.
170. L. Hope O'Keeffe, Admininstrative Law Judges, Performance
Evaluation, and Production Standards: Judicial Independence Versus Employee
Accountability, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 591, 602 (1986); S. 262, 96th Cong. (2d
Sess. 1980) (performance evaluated at least once every 10 years); H.R. 6768, 96th
Cong. (2d Sess. 1980) (performance evaluated at least once every 6 years); and S.
755, 96th Cong. (2d 1980) (appointment for 7 to 10 year term with reappointment
based on performance evaluation).
171. Id. at 602.
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or an appearance of objectivity . . . [t]he fear of discipline would
172
inevitably mix into decision-making."'

The Uneasy Existence of the ALJ
An examination of the neutrality question reveals an important
element of the ALJ's uneasy existence. While Congress and the
courts stress the impartiality/objectivity and accuracy principles,
agencies seek to emphasize the consistency principles. Thus, despite
the statutory provisions proscribing agencies' ratings of ALJ
performance, agency heads "face strong pressures to curb ALJs who
deviate from desired norms."' 7 3 Hope O'Keeffe observed that
agency managers are "frustrated by the delicate balance inherent in
managing a group of critical employees charged with implementing
an agency's policy but nevertheless supposedly independent of the
agency."' 174 Although the APA authorizes agencies to review ALJs
decisions, such after-the-fact correction of a single decision supplies
insufficient control. 75 O'Keeffe remarked that agencies, therefore,
"gaze lustfully at the forbidden fruit of performance evaluation."' 176
Richard Pierce noted this frustration in the SSA where agency
managers have attempted to reduce variation in ALJ reversal rates of
disability awards. 177 Federal judges have consistently held that the
SSA attempts to control ALJs through the use of "management
science" were unlawful. 178 According to Pierce, the rejection of
172. Id. at 600 (quoting JOINT REPORT OF COMM. ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
AND COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REFORM OF FEDERAL REGULATION, S. RES. NO.
1018, 96th Cong. (2d Sess., pt. 2, at 70-71 (1980)).
173. Id. at 594.
174. Id.
175. Id.

176. Id. at 595.
177. Pierce, supra note 66, at 513.
178. Id. at 483-84. The cases holding that the SSA unlawfully attempted to

control ALJ decisions include: Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 (1984); W.C. v.
Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied and opinion amended,

819 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1987); Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980); Ass'n
of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F.Supp. 1132, 1141-43 (D.D.C. 1984);
Gulan v. Heckler, 583 F.Supp. 1010, 1018 (N.D. I11. 1984) (stating "[t]here is no

room in our system of justice for Nazi or Soviet-type misuse and abuse of judges,

402

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

22-2

these agency initiatives is an indication that judges are "abysmally
ignorant of the techniques involved in bureaucratic decision-making,
management science, quality control, and
scientific decision-making,
17 9
statistics."
Further manifestations of the uneasy position of ALJs are cited in
a report submitted to the Administrative Conference of the United
States ("ACUS"). 180 To improve the current system, the report
1 81
recommended several changes to the existing statutory scheme.
Some of the changes include: (1) converting many AJs to ALJs
without going through competitive selection; (2) lowering standards
for ALJ selection to obtain more women and minority ALJs; (3)
eliminating litigation experience as a qualification; and (4) providing
for annual performance reviews of ALJs by the Chief ALJ, who
could issue reprimands and recommend disciplinary proceedings. 182
For those advocating a court-centered approach, the functions of
executive branch decision-makers, namely presiding at hearings and
reporting their findings, seem too familiar to the functions of
traditional judges to abandon an approach based on traditional court
values. However, this approach seems incompatible to advocates of
the agency-centered approach, who see examiners as contributing to
the overall competency and expertise to the task of policy formation.
Despite the tensions between management control and decider
independence that characterizes the AL' s existence, several
proposals for performance evaluations have failed. 183 For some, the

and no ALJ should be exposed or succumb to such pressure."); Sailing v. Bowen,
641 F.Supp. 1046, 1056 (W.D. Va. 1986) (stating that "Itihis court finds that [the
review constitutes] simply nothing more or less than an attempt by the bureaucracy
to control the independence of the ALJs."). James P. Timony, Performance
Evaluation of FederalAdministrative Law Judges, 7 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 629, n.41
(1994).
179. See Pierce, supra note 66, at 516.
180. PAUL VERKUIL, DANIEL GIFFORD, CHARLES KOCH, RICHARD PIERCE &
JEFFREY LUBBERS, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 183-85 (1992).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. O'Keeffe, supra note 170, at 593-99.
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political lessons are clear: 84"Management techniques are no match for
claims of independence."'

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis of the ALJ has examined the nature of the
dispute between two opposing ideological approaches and considered
how original compromises between these two camps have led to an
uneasy existence for the AID. The ALJ seems condemned to this
uneasy existence for the foreseeable future as changes in
administrative decision-making have been rendered virtually
academic by the force of the court-centered approach. The Legal
Process school has influenced the legal profession to such a degree
that it seems self-evident to many of today's administrative lawyers
and judges that the best method to resolve conflicts before an
administrative agency is to "judicialize" agency decision-making
processes. One explanation is that the power of court-centered
symbols is matched by an inability among administrators to create
effective agency-centered symbols.' 85 To combat this court-centered
hegemony, it is imperative to return to the first principles of the
agency-centered approach and construct a justification for
administrative reform build on this solid ground. This paper's
exposition of the agency-centered approach is thus an important step
toward a theory of administrative law that embraces alternative
schemes and models of administrative decision-making.

184. Paul Verkuil, Reflections Upon the FederalAdministrative Judiciary, 39

UCLA L. REv. 1341, 1355 (1992).
185. Musolf, supra note 97, at 177 (wondering whether ALJs are the ultimate
victim of this imbalance in symbolization).

